Oligopoly pricing : old ideas and new tools

The "oligopoly problem"--The question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors--is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pri...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Vives, Xavier.
Formato: Libro
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Cambridge, Massachusetts : MIT Press, c1999.
Materias:
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245 1 0 |a Oligopoly pricing :   |b old ideas and new tools /   |c Xavier Vives. 
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300 # # |a xiv, 425 p. :   |b ilustraciones ;   |c 24 cm. 
504 # # |a Incluye bibliografía : (pág. [385] -413) 
520 3 # |a The "oligopoly problem"--The question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors--is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field--including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson--to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games. 
650 0 7 |a Economía.  |2 unescot. 
650 0 7 |a Precio.  |2 unescot. 
650 0 7 |a Competición.  |2 unescot. 
650 0 7 |a Teoría de juegos.  |2 inti. 
653 0 0 |a Oligopolios. 
653 0 0 |a Precios de oligopolio. 
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